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Equity and Amateurism: How the NCAA
Self-Employment Guidelines are Justified
and Do Not Violate Antitrust Law
Taylor O’Toole*
ABSTRACT
The NCAA’s longstanding tradition of amateurism is a pillar of the
NCAA that has been regularly challenged by student-athletes and the
public. The NCAA has set forth numerous guidelines to safeguard this
tradition, including the Self-Employment Guidelines, which provide that
a student-athlete may not use his or her name, image, likeness, or
reputation as an NCAA athlete in the promotion of his or her business.
The Self-Employment Guidelines have become particularly relevant and
controversial recently, as the NCAA has found student-athletes to be
ineligible based on these Guidelines, and has warned future studentathletes against these practices in order to remain in compliance. In
August 2017, Donald De La Haye, the kicker for the University of
Central Florida, was deemed ineligible for a violation of the SelfEmployment Guidelines after receiving advertising revenues on his
YouTube channel. Additionally, the NCAA has expressed concern over
highly anticipated sixteen-year-old basketball star LaMelo Ball’s
participation in his family’s business, Big Baller Brand.
Antitrust claims are a common vehicle for student-athletes to
challenge NCAA regulations. Thus, this Comment will engage in a rule
of reason analysis of the NCAA’s Self-Employment Guidelines to
determine if the maintenance of the tradition of amateurism, along with
the desire for parity amongst universities and amongst student-athletes,
sufficiently justifies any anticompetitive effects that the student-athletes
might feel from the Self-Employment Guidelines. Ultimately, this
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Comment will conclude that the procompetitive justifications outweigh
the anticompetitive effects of the Guidelines.
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INTRODUCTION

Student-athletes at times feel stifled by National Collegiate Athletic
Association (“NCAA”) regulations, as they have bigger dreams beyond
their intercollegiate athletics careers.1 Whether their aspirations are to
play a sport professionally, open their own business, or work for a large
corporation, the ultimate goal is to make a living doing it.2 Those
student-athletes with an entrepreneurial spirit are often inspired to use the
resources available to them to their advantage.3 Many times, the most
valuable resources are their own name, image, likeness, and reputation.
In the 2017-2018 NCAA Division I Manual (“NCAA Manual”),4
the NCAA set forth a number of regulations to protect their product,
which relies heavily on the maintenance of the tradition of amateurism. 5
Amateurism6 has been a pillar of the NCAA since its inception, and is
characterized primarily by a lack of direct or indirect compensation for
athletes.7 Article 12 of the NCAA Manual provides a comprehensive list
of eligibility rules to protect the tradition of amateurism. 8 While studentathletes have attempted to challenge a number of these eligibility rules in
the past, courts have yet to make a determination on the legality of the
NCAA’s Self-Employment Guidelines, which restrict student-athletes’
ability to use their name, image, likeness, or status as an NCAA athlete
in order to promote his or her product or business.9

1. For example, Donald De La Haye has felt stifled by the NCAA’s regulations, as
the regulations have forced him to choose between his YouTube channel and his
intercollegiate athletics career. See Iliana Limón Romero, UCF YouTube kicker seeks
donations, unsure about legal options, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 1, 2017, 9:30 PM),
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/sports/ucf-knights/os-sp-ucf-kicker-ncaa-reaction-0802story.html.
2. See generally id (discussing De La Haye’s financial struggles, and how he uses
his YouTube channel to earn a living).
3. See, e.g., Donald De La Haye (@Deestroying), YOUTUBE (Apr. 1, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HA9ln1wmxgc (showing De La Haye practicing his
sprints for football); see also Donald De La Haye (@Deestroying), YOUTUBE (Mar. 13,
2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d8PG8BJdzfY (showing De La Haye working
out with teammates and practicing his kicking).
4. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2017–2018 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL
(2017),
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D118.pdf
[hereinafter
NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL].
5. See id., art. 2.9, at 4.
6. See Amateur, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/amateur (last visited Aug. 14, 2018) (defining an amateur as one who “who
engages in a pursuit, especially a sport, on an unpaid basis”).
7. See infra Section II.A.1 (discussing the history and definition of amateurism).
8. See NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 12, at 61-91.
9. See id., art. 12.4.4, at 72.
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This Comment will examine the NCAA’s dedication to the tradition
of amateurism through the Self-Employment Guidelines and whether that
commitment has led to a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.10 First,
Part II of this Comment will provide a brief history of the NCAA and the
NCAA Manual, followed by a description of the elements required to
assert a claim under the Sherman Antitrust Act.11 Next, Part III will
engage in a “rule of reason” analysis to determine if the SelfEmployment Guidelines are sufficiently procompetitive to justify their
alleged anticompetitive effects.12 Part III will then analyze the selfemployment of LaMelo Ball and Donald De La Haye to examine how
the indirect compensation they received for their athletic ability
potentially damaged the NCAA’s product.13 This Comment will
ultimately recommend that the Supreme Court grant certiorari to a case
challenging the NCAA’s rules against indirect compensation for athletic
ability, and hold that the Self-Employment Guidelines do not violate the
Sherman Antitrust Act.14
II.

BACKGROUND

The NCAA has a long and telling history that gives courts insight as
to the NCAA’s motives and objectives in its governance of
intercollegiate athletics.15 These motives and objectives in turn influence
the courts’ interpretations of the NCAA’s guidelines. Student-athletes
have regularly used antitrust law to challenge the NCAA’s guidelines,
but student-athletes are often unsuccessful, as courts tend to be
persuaded by arguments for the maintenance of the tradition of
amateurism.
A.

History of the NCAA

In the early twentieth century, scandals, cheating, and serious
injuries were common amongst intercollegiate athletic programs, leading
President Theodore Roosevelt to call for the formation of a governing

10. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012 & Supp. 2017)).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Section III.C.
14. .See infra Part IV.
15. See
generally
History,
NAT’L
COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC
ASS’N,
https://web.archive.org/web/20110807060521/http://www.ncaa.org:80/wps/wcm/connect/
public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/who+we+are/about+the+ncaa+history (last updated Nov. 8,
2010) [hereinafter NCAA, History] (providing details as to the NCAA’s formation and
growth as a governing body).
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body to help curtail these issues.16 Originally called the Intercollegiate
Athletic Association of the United States (“IAAUS”), the NCAA was
formed in 1906 by 62 member institutions.17
The NCAA began as a rule-making body and discussion group, but
over time developed into a much larger and more complex
organization.18 With the creation of national championship games and
increased regulations in areas like recruiting and financial aid, the NCAA
grew quickly.19 This surge in growth created a demand for full-time
professional leadership, leading to the appointment of Walter Byrnes as
the NCAA’s first Executive Director in 1951.20 With new leadership, the
NCAA continued to expand their influence.21 The NCAA not only grew
to dictate rule-making for more sports, but it also expanded its
sanctioning authority with the creation of the Committee on Infractions.22
The Committee on Infractions was created in the 1950s as a more
powerful force in ensuring that member institutions were complying with
NCAA rules.23
The NCAA continued to grow rapidly throughout the late twentieth
century,24 thus leading to the creation of Divisions I, II, and III in 1973.25
These divisions were created for both competitive and legislative
purposes, and to account for the increased membership and varying
levels of emphasis on athletics at each member institution.26 In the 1980s,
16. See id.
17. See id. (stating that the IAAUS was renamed the National Collegiate Athletic
Association in 1910).
18. See id.
19. See id. (stating the NCAA hosted its first national championship in 1921 for
Track and Field, and that the “Sanity Code” was the NCAA’s attempt to regulate
recruitment and financial aid).
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See NCAA, History, supra note 15.
26. See id.; see also Divisional Differences and the History of Multidivisional
Classification, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-weare/membership/divisional-differences-and-history-multidivision-classification
(last
visited Aug. 14, 2018) [hereinafter NCAA, Divisional Differences]. Division I requires
institutions to sponsor at least seven sports for men and seven sports for women, or six
sports for men and eight for women. Id. Division I also has strict contest minimums,
participation minimums, and scheduling criteria for each sport. Id. Member institutions in
Division I must also meet the requisite minimum for financial aid awards for their athletic
programs, and may not exceed the maximum financial aid awards for each individual
sport. Id. Division II and Division III both require their member institutions to sponsor at
least five sports for men and five sports for women, or four sports for men and six for
women. Id. However, they differ in that Division II has strict scheduling criteria,
especially for football and basketball teams, while Division III institutions do not. Id.
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the NCAA greatly expanded again; this time to include women’s
sports.27 Today, the NCAA consists of 1,123 member institutions with
nearly half of a million college athletes under its influence and
direction.28
1.

Amateurism and the NCAA

Amateurism in sports is the idea that athletes have not played their
sport professionally, meaning that they have not entered into contracts
with a professional teams or agents, or profited from their athletic ability
above the cost of their expenses.29 An amateur is often defined as “a
person who engages in a pursuit, especially a sport, on an unpaid
basis.”30 Amateurism has been the NCAA’s eligibility standard since its
inception in 1906.31 The IAAUS, and eventually the NCAA, adopted
bylaws that outlined the principles of amateurism and ways to avoid
violating those principles.32 In 1916, the NCAA provided more detailed
guidance for member institutions by formally defining an amateur as
“one who participated in competitive physical sports only for the
pleasure and the physical, mental, moral and social benefits directly
derived therefrom.”33 The NCAA operated using this definition of
Notably, Division III member institutions may not distribute financial aid based on a
student-athlete’s athletic ability, whereas, like Division I institutions, Division II
institutions may, so long as they do not exceed the maximum financial aid awards for
each sport. Id.
27. See NCAA, History, supra note 15.
28. See What is the NCAA?, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa-101/what-ncaa (last visited Aug.
14, 2018).
29. Amateurism, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/
amateurism (last visited Jan. 19, 2018, 1:00 PM).
30. Amateur, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/amateur (last visited Aug. 14, 2018).
31. See Gregory Sconzo, They’re Not Yours, They Are My Own: How NCAA
Employment Restrictions Violate Antitrust Law, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737, 742-43 (2013)
(citing MATHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND PROBLEMS 100 (2d ed. 2009)).
32. See W. Burlette Carter, The Age of Innocence: The First 25 Years of the National
Collegiate Athletic Association, 1906 to 1931, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 211, 222
(2006) (discussing the IAAUS 1906 bylaws, which decreed that “[n]o student shall
represent a College or University in any intercollegiate game or contest who at any time
received either directly or indirectly, money or other consideration, to play on any team,
or for his athletic services,” and further explaining the IAAUS student-athlete eligibility
rules). Additionally, student-athletes were required to sign an “Eligibility Card” to verify
their eligibility based on compliance with the amateurism principles. See id. at 223-224.
33. Sconzo, supra note 31, at 743 (citing Kay Hawes, Debate on Amateurism Has
Evolved over Time, NCAA NEWS (Jan. 3, 2000), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/
NCAANewsArchive/2000/associationwide/debate%2Bon%C2Bamateurism%C2Bhas%C
2Bevolved%C2Bover%C2Btime%2B-%2B1-3-00.html).
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“amateur” for many years; however, the amateurism guidelines were not
strictly enforced until the 1950s with the creation of the Committee on
Infractions.34 The Committee on Infractions had great sanctioning
authority, which allowed them to fully enforce the amateurism rules.35
Presently, the NCAA and the courts clearly continue to place
enormous value on the principles of amateurism.36 In the NCAA Manual,
the NCAA unambiguously identifies its basic purpose as “maintain[ing]
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and
the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by doing so,
retain[ing] a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics
and professional sports.”37 This separation between professional and
intercollegiate athletics is created and maintained by the NCAA
amateurism requirement.38 The NCAA further emphasizes the
importance of amateurism by providing explicit examples of how
student-athletes can lose their amateur status later in the NCAA
Manual.39
Moreover, the courts have continuously protected the NCAA’s
tradition of amateurism.40 The Supreme Court of the United States and
the federal circuit courts have consistently chosen to defend the NCAA’s
tradition of amateurism when presented with opportunities to uproot that
34. See id.
35. See NCAA, History, supra note 15.
36. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85, 120 (1984) (stating that the “role of the NCAA must be to preserve [the]
tradition [of amateurism] that might otherwise die” and “[t]here can be no question but
that it needs ample latitude to play that role”).
37. NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 1.3.1, at 1 (emphasis added).
38. See id., art. 12, at 61-91.
39. See id., art. 12.1.2, at 63 (stating that student-athletes will lose their amateur
status, and therefore be deemed ineligible by the NCAA, if they do any of the following
activities). Article 12.1.2 prohibits a student-athlete from:
(a) Us[ing] his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any
form in that sport; (b) Accept[ing] a promise of pay even if such pay is to
be received following completion of intercollegiate athletics participation;
(c) Sign[ing] a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional
athletics, regardless of its legal enforceability or any consideration
received, except as permitted in Bylaw 12.2.5.1; (d) Receiv[ing], directly
or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of expenses or any other form of
financial assistance from a professional sports organization based on
athletics skill or participation, except as permitted by NCAA rules and
regulations; (e) Compet[ing] on any professional athletics team per Bylaw
12.02.11, even if no pay or remuneration for expenses was received,
except as permitted in Bylaw 12.2.3.2.1; (f) After initial full-time
collegiate enrollment, enter[ing] into a professional draft (see Bylaw
12.2.4); or (g) Enter[ing] into an agreement with an agent.
Id.
40. See infra Part III.
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tradition.41 For example, as recently as October 2016, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari to O’Bannon v. NCAA,42 a case in which Ed
O’Bannon43 submitted a writ of certiorari challenging the NCAA’s
tradition of amateurism on antitrust grounds.44 In O’Bannon, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals safeguarded the tradition of amateurism by
denying the student-athletes’ demands for compensation beyond the cost
of attendance at their respective schools.45 This case is just one example
of student-athletes challenging NCAA policies on antitrust grounds, and
provides interesting discussion as to what the court feels it means to be
an amateur athlete.
B.

Antitrust Law Generally

In 1890, Congress passed the first antitrust law, which is known as
the Sherman Antitrust Act.46 Originally, the Sherman Antitrust Act was
simply a “comprehensive charter designed to preserve free and
unfettered competition as a rule of trade.”47 Now, the Sherman Antitrust
Act is intended to promote competition amongst businesses to prevent
the creation of monopolies.48 To be a violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, a claim must contain: (1) an existing contract, combination, or
conspiracy; (2) an unreasonable restraint on trade in a relevant market
resulting from the contract, combination, or conspiracy; and (3) an injury
resulting from the unreasonable restraint on trade.49 A per se analysis or a
“rule of reason” analysis is applied to determine if the allegations arise to
41. See, e.g., O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016) (finding the maintenance of the tradition of
amateurism to be persuasive in making its decision, and the Supreme Court ultimately
denying certiorari to the case despite both parties requesting review).
42. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015),
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016).
43. Ed O’Bannon is a former amateur basketball player at University of California,
Los Angeles and professional basketball player in the National Basketball Association.
See Tom Hoffarth, Hoffarth on the Media: Q&A with Ed O’Bannon, ORANGE COUNTY
REG. (Mar. 10, 2018, 8:00 AM) https://www.ocregister.com/2018/03/10/hoffarth-on-themedia-qa-with-ed-obannon/.
44. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13-34, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016) (No. 15-1167), 2016 WL 1085599.
45. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076-79.
46. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
event/Sherman-Antitrust-Act (last visited June 16, 2018).
47. A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust at the Turn of the Century, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE (Dec. 7, 1999), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/antitrust-turn-century.
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012 & Supp. 2017).
49. See Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 2012)
(citing Denny’s Marina, Inc. v. Renfro Prods., Inc., 8 F.3d 1217, 1220 (7th Cir. 1993));
see also infra Section II.D.1.
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an unreasonable restraint on trade, and therefore, a violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.50
1.

Elements of a Sherman Antitrust Act Violation

Section One of the Sherman Antitrust Act states that “[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal,”51 and has consistently been interpreted
to require plaintiffs to prove three elements to demonstrate a violation of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.52
The three elements are: (1) an existing contract, combination, or
conspiracy, (2) an unreasonable restraint on trade in a relevant market
resulting from the contract, combination, or conspiracy, and (3) an injury
resulting from the unreasonable restraint on trade.53 The Supreme Court
has specified that Section One only bars those restraints on trade that are
considered unreasonable.54 The requirement of unreasonableness is
particularly important because nearly every contract requiring parties to
behave in a certain way constitutes some type of restraint of trade.55

50. See infra Section II.D.2.
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 1.
52. See Agnew, 683 F.3d at 335 (citing Denny’s Marina, 8 F.3d at 1220); see also
Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998).
53. Id. (citing Denny’s Marina, 8 F.3d at 1220).
54. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85, 120 (1984) (finding that a horizontal price fixing agreement that places a
restraint on output is an unreasonable restraint on trade); see also Arizona v. Maricopa
Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1982); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88 (1978) (stating that the “[p]etitioner’s ban on competitive
bidding prevent[ed] all customers from making price comparisons in the initial selection
of an engineer,” and after an application of the rule of reason analysis, this constituted an
unreasonable restraint on trade); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,
238 (1918); Law, 134 F.3d at 1016 (finding that the limit placed on coaches’
compensation was an unreasonable restraint on trade, after a thorough rule of reason
analysis). In a rule of reason analysis, a regulation is deemed to be unreasonable if the
anticompetitive effects of the regulation outweigh the procompetitive effects. Bd. of
Regents, 468 U.S. at 103-05.
55. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 98 (stating that the challenged NCAA practices
are undoubtedly a restraint on trade, as they limit the member institution’s ability to
freely negotiate their own television contracts, but the Supreme Court has consistently
recognized that the Sherman Antitrust Act only bars unreasonable restraints); Law, 134
F.3d at 1016.
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Two Analyses to Determine if a Practice is an Unreasonable
Restraint on Trade

Once a claim is determined to arise under the Sherman Antitrust
Act, the court will apply one of two analyses to determine the
reasonableness of the challenged restraint.56 A per se analysis and a rule
of reason analysis are the two accepted ways of evaluating whether a
practice constitutes an unreasonable restraint on trade.57 A court will look
to the surrounding circumstances of a case when determining which
analysis to apply.58
a.

Per Se Analysis

A per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act is reserved for those
practices or regulations that are blatantly unreasonable restraints on
trade.59 A regulation is a blatantly unreasonable restraint on trade, and
therefore illegal per se,60 “when surrounding circumstances make the
likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to render unjustified
further examination of the challenged conduct.”61 Therefore, once a
regulation is deemed illegal per se, the court is not required to make any
further inquiry into the procompetitive justifications for the regulation,
and may deem the regulation a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.62
A per se analysis of a Sherman Antitrust Act claim is only applied
to those practices “that ‘are entirely void of redeeming competitive
rationales.’”63 The Supreme Court, in NCAA v. Board of Regents of
University of Oklahoma,64 explained that a practice that is void of
competitive rationales is one that “facially appears to be one that would
always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease

56. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100-04.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 101, 103-04 (considering that “this case involves an industry in which
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all,”
and therefore, the rule of reason analysis is appropriate in order to fully consider the
anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifications).
59. See id.
60. See Illegal per se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “illegal
per se” as something “unlawful in and of itself”).
61. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103-04.
62. See Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir.
1998)
63. Id. (citing SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 1994)).
64. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85 (1984).
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output.”65 The Supreme Court has also continuously emphasized that a
per se analysis “is a ‘demanding’ standard that should be applied only in
clear cut cases.”66
b.

Rule of Reason Analysis

A rule of reason analysis is appropriate whenever further inquiry
into the procompetitive justifications for a regulation is warranted.67
Therefore, if the court does not deem the regulation to be illegal per se, a
rule of reason analysis is appropriate.68
A rule of reason analysis consists of four steps with shifting burdens
of proof.69 Step one places the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show
that the regulations have anticompetitive effects.70 If the plaintiff meets
that burden, step two then shifts the burden to the defendant to provide
procompetitive justifications for the regulations.71 If the defendant meets
that burden, step three subsequently shifts the burden back to the plaintiff

65. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100 (citing Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Law, 134 F.3d at 1019 (citing Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 50 (1977)) (recognizing that a rule of reason analysis is appropriate, even in cases of
horizontal price fixing, when the industry involved is one that requires some horizontal
restraints for the product to be available). Horizontal price fixing is defined as “pricefixing among competitors on the same level, such as retailers throughout an industry.”
Price-fixing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Horizontal price fixing is
typically deemed to be a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948) (finding that the
agreement amongst sugar refiners to purchase sugar-beets at a previously agreed upon
price likely constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act); see also Nat’l
Macaroni Mfrs. Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 345 F.2d 421, 426-27 (7th Cir. 1965)
(finding that the agreement amongst macaroni producers to limit the amount of premium
wheat purchased and substitute a specifically agreed upon percentage of inferior wheat
into the finished macaroni was a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act because
this agreement had the effect of artificially reducing the price of premium wheat).
67. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100-04; see also Law, 134 F.3d at 1016-19.
68. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100-04; see also Law, 134 F.3d at 1016-19.
69. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1019; see also Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 2012).
70. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1019 (stating the plaintiff’s burden of proving
anticompetitive effects, and further explaining that “[a] plaintiff may establish
anticompetitive effect indirectly by proving that the defendant possessed the requisite
market power within a defined market or directly by showing actual anticompetitive
effects, such as control over output or price” (citing Orson Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp.,
79 F.3d 1358, 1367 (10th Cir. 1998))); see also Agnew, 683 F.3d at 335.
71. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1019, 1021 (stating the defendant’s burden of proving
procompetitive effects, and further explaining that procompetitive “[j]ustifications
offered under the rule of reason may be considered only to the extent that they tend to
show that, on balance, ‘the challenged restraint enhances competition’” (quoting Bd. of
Regents, 468 U.S. at 1004)); see also Agnew, 683 F.3d at 335-36.
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to show that the regulations are “not reasonably necessary to achieve the
legitimate objectives or that those objectives can be achieved in a
substantially less restrictive manner.”72 Finally, step four requires the
judge to weigh the alleged procompetitive effects against the alleged
anticompetitive effects to determine if the regulation at issue constitutes
an unreasonable restraint on trade.73
Notably, some regulations that were seemingly illegal per se have
been deemed by the Supreme Court to instead warrant a rule of reason
analysis.74 In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court decided that a rule of
reason analysis should be applied despite the agreement at issue
constituting a horizontal price fixing75 plan in blatant violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.76 The Court rationalized that the rule of reason
analysis was appropriate because the industry of intercollegiate athletics
required some degree of horizontal restraints in order to ensure that the
product remained available.77
C.

History of the NCAA and Antitrust

As the NCAA continued to expand its influence, student-athletes,
coaches, and athletic associations began to challenge the extensive
NCAA regulations on antitrust grounds.78 In 1981, the Board of Regents
of the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia Athletic
Association filed a class action suit in the Western District of
Oklahoma.79 This class action suit alleged that the NCAA’s agreement
with a network regarding the televising of college football games was an
unreasonable restraint on trade and constituted an attempt to monopolize
the market.80 After decisions in the district court and the court of appeals,
the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.81 In Board of
72. Law, 134 F.3d at 1019; see also Agnew, 683 F.3d at 336.
73. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1019.
74. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100.
75. See supra note 66 (describing horizontal price fixing).
76. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100-01, 103 (reasoning that “despite the fact that
this case involves restraints on the ability of member institutions to compete in terms of
price and output, a fair evaluation of their competitive character requires consideration of
the NCAA’s justifications for the restraints”).
77. See id. at 101.
78. See, e.g., id. at 88, 94-99.
79. See id. at 95.
80. See Complaint at 31-39, Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 546 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (No. CIV-81-1209-E),
1981 WL 760127.
81. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 95-98 (describing the decisions of the district
court and the court of appeals). The District Court found that control exhibited by the
NCAA over the televising of college football games constituted a violation of the
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Regents, the Supreme Court performed a thorough antitrust analysis
using the rule of reason test to assess the legality of the NCAA’s price
fixing plan for televised college football games.82 Notably, the Supreme
Court recognized that the NCAA is subject to antitrust laws, and that the
price fixing plan at issue constituted an unreasonable restraint on trade in
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.83
In the decades following the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of
Regents, federal circuit courts across the country have used this decision
to hold the NCAA accountable for those regulations placing an
unreasonable restraint on trade, while also allowing the NCAA to argue
that the procompetitive effects justify their regulations.84 The Tenth
Circuit, in Law v. NCAA,85 applied the same rule of reason analysis as the
Supreme Court in Board of Regents.86 In Law, the court found that an
NCAA rule that placed a limit on the annual compensation for college
basketball coaches constituted an unreasonable restraint on trade that
could not be justified by the alleged procompetitive effects, and was
therefore a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.87
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Agnew v. NCAA88 also applied the
rule of reason analysis in considering the viability of the claim at issue.89
In Agnew, student-athletes alleged that the NCAA regulations that put a
cap on the number of scholarships available per team had anticompetitive
effects on the market for student-athletes, and was therefore a violation
of the Sherman Antitrust Act.90 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s decision to dismiss the claim on grounds that the Sherman

Sherman Antitrust Act. Id. at 95. The Court of Appeals similarly found that the NCAA
television plan at issue was a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and even if a
rule of reason analysis were to be applied, the anticompetitive effects would outweigh
any procompetitive justifications set forth by the NCAA. Id. at 97-98.
82. See id. at 105-12. A rule of reason analysis consists of four steps. Id. First, the
plaintiff must show that the regulation at issue has anticompetitive effects. Id. Next, the
defendant is tasked with providing procompetitive justifications for the regulation. Id.
Then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s goals can be
achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner. Id. Finally, the judge is required to
weigh the alleged procompetitive and anticompetitive effects to determine if the
regulation constitutes an unreasonable restraint on trade. Id.
83. See id. at 105-12; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012 & Supp. 2017) (delineating the
Sherman Antitrust Act, which is designed to protect competition and prevent agreements
and regulations that are unreasonable restraints on trade).
84. See infra Section III.A.2.b.
85. Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
86. See id.
87. See id. at 1016-24.
88. Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).
89. See id.
90. See id. at 333.
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Antitrust Act was inapplicable because the plaintiffs failed to show a
labor market for student-athletes.91
Overall, the decisions in Board of Regents, Law, and Agnew
showcase the widespread acceptance of the rule of reason analysis, and
how courts hold both parties, student-athletes, and the NCAA to a high
standard for proving that the regulations at issue are either
procompetitive or anticompetitive.
D.

NCAA Guidelines for Student-Athletes

The NCAA Manual provides specific guidelines for member
institutions, athletics personnel, and student-athletes to follow.92 These
guidelines cover a vast assortment of areas, from information on how to
become a member of the NCAA, to championship procedures, to athlete
eligibility.93 Specifically, Article 12 of the NCAA Manual describes the
relationship between amateurism and the athletic eligibility process.94
Article 12 emphasizes the importance of amateurism in determining a
student-athlete’s eligibility by providing specific details as to how
student-athletes can maintain their amateur status and eligibility, and
how that status and eligibility can be lost.95
1.

Student-Athlete Employment Guidelines Generally

Article 12.4 of the NCAA Manual lays out specific guidelines for
student-athletes seeking employment while simultaneously playing a
sport for their school.96 Article 12.4.1 states that “[c]ompensation may be
paid to a student athlete: (a) [o]nly for work actually performed; and (b)
[a]t a rate commensurate with the going rate in the locality for similar
services.”97 This article clearly seeks to ensure that student-athletes are

91. See id. at 347. The Seventh Circuit made it clear that the identification of a
relevant market was necessary in order to show how the regulation at issue had an
anticompetitive effect on that particular market. Id at 345-47. Here, the plaintiffs alleged
that the relevant markets were the market for bachelor’s degrees and the market for
student-athlete labor. Id. The court was not persuaded by the argument that the market for
bachelor’s degrees was a relevant market because the argument was vague and the
market would have encompassed far more people than just those student-athletes
receiving scholarships. Id. The court notes that the market for student-athlete labor could
be a relevant market, however, the plaintiffs did not sufficiently identify this market in
their complaint. Id. Thus, the court chose to dismiss the claim. Id.
92. See generally NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4.
93. See id., Table of Contents, at iii-v.
94. See id., art. 12, at 61-91.
95. See id.
96. See id., art. 12.4, at 72.
97. Id., art. 12.4.1, at 72.
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not given special treatment, in the form of additional compensation, in
the course of their employment.98 Article 12.4.1.1 specifies that “[s]uch
compensation may not include any remuneration for value or utility that
the student-athlete may have for the employer because of the publicity,
reputation or personal following that he or she has obtained because of
athletics ability.”99 In other words, Article 12 places emphasis on the
NCAA’s dedication to amateurism by attempting to ensure that studentathletes do not become professionals through receipt of compensation
due to their athletic ability, either directly or indirectly.100
Moreover, NCAA Manual Articles 12.4.2.3 and 12.5 provide
guidance for those student-athletes seeking to be employed to sell or
promote sporting equipment.101 Article 12.4.2.3 states, “[a] studentathlete may not be employed to sell equipment related to the studentathlete’s sport if his or her name, picture or athletics reputation is used to
advertise the product, the job or the employer.”102 This is similar to the
guideline set forth in Article 12.5, which outlines non-permissible
promotional activities and exceptions to those rules.103
Once a student-athlete becomes an NCAA student-athlete, they are
prohibited from advertising and promotional activities unless the activity
falls into one of the exceptions delineated in Article 12.5.2.1.1.104 An
important exception to this general rule is the exception which allows for
the “[c]ontinuation of [m]odeling and [o]ther [n]onathletically [r]elated
[p]romotional [a]ctivities [a]fter [e]nrollment.”105 This exception allows a
student-athlete to continue to receive compensation for promotional
activities that use his or her name or picture to promote the sale of a
product or service, as long as a number of conditions are met.106 These
conditions are:
(a) The individual’s involvement in this type of activity was initiated
prior to his or her enrollment in a member institution; (b) The
individual became involved in such activities for reasons independent
of athletics ability; (c) No reference is made in these activities to the
individual’s name or involvement in intercollegiate athletics; (d) The
individual’s remuneration under such circumstances is at a rate
commensurate with the individual’s skills and experience as a model or
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See id.
Id., art. 12.4.1.1, at 72.
See id.
See id., art. 12.4.2.3, at 72; see also id., art. 12.5, at 73-77.
See NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 12.4.2.3, at 72.
See NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 12.5, at 73-77.
See id., art. 12.5.2.1.1, at 75-76.
Id., art. 12.5.1.3, at 74.
See id.
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performer and is not based in any way upon the individual’s athletics
ability or reputation.107

These conditions help to ensure that student-athletes maintain their
amateur status, despite their employment.
2.

Student-Athlete Self-Employment Guidelines

NCAA Manual Article 12.4.4 specifically addresses those studentathletes seeking to start their own business.108 Article 12.4.4 states, “[a]
student-athlete may establish his or her own business, provided the
student-athlete’s name, photograph, appearance or athletics reputation
are not used to promote the business.”109 These guidelines are similar to
those set forth earlier in Article 12.4 for general employment, as the
NCAA is consistent in barring student-athletes from using their name,
image, likeness, and reputation as an NCAA athlete for financial gain.110
3.

The Student-Athlete Statement

Each year, all NCAA student-athletes are required to sign the
Student-Athlete Statement to assist the NCAA in certifying their
eligibility.111 The 2018-2019 Student-Athlete Statement contains six
sections, which include: “I. A statement concerning eligibility; II. A
Buckley Amendment consent;112 III. An affirmation of status as an
amateur athlete; IV. Results of drug tests; V. Previous involvement in
NCAA rules violation(s); and VI. An affirmation of valid and accurate
information provided to the NCAA Eligibility Center.”113 Studentathletes are required to sign each section in order to certify the

107. Id.
108. See id., art. 12.4.4, at 72.
109. Id.
110. See id.; see also id., art. 12.4.1, at 72.
111. See Form 18-1a: Student-Athlete Statement, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N
(2018),
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/201819_DIForm_18_1a_Student_Athlete_Stateme
nt_20180608.pdf [hereinafter NCAA, Form 18-1a]. NCAA Division I compliance forms
are updated on an annual basis and published online at Division I Compliance, NAT’L
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/compliance?division=d1 (last visited
Aug. 19, 2018).
112. See NCAA, Form 18-1a, supra note 111, at 3-4 (requiring student-athletes to
consent to the disclosure of their academic records, drug test records, and other related
information, to authorized representatives of their institution, the NCAA, and their
athletics conference).
113. Id. at 1.
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information they provided to the NCAA, and to certify that they read and
understand the NCAA rules as delineated in the NCAA Manual.114
The completion of the Student-Athlete Statement is required by
NCAA Manual Articles 3.2.4.6115 and 12.7.2.116 Article 3.2.4.6 generally
requires that each student-athlete sign a statement,117 whereas Article
12.7.2.1 provides that the statement should contain information about the
student-athlete’s “eligibility, recruitment, financial aid, amateur status,
previous positive-drug tests administered by any other athletics
organization[,] and involvement in organized gambling activities related
to intercollegiate or professional athletics competition.”118 A studentathlete that fails to sign such a statement would be deemed to be
ineligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics.119
The signing of the Student-Athlete Statement by hundreds of
thousands of student-athletes every year demonstrates the vast power of
the NCAA to control the behaviors of student-athletes. Nevertheless,
increasing discontent with that power has led to more than a few
challenges to NCAA regulations on antitrust grounds.120 These
challenges will likely continue to grow in number until the Supreme
Court decides to grant certiorari to one of these cases to ultimately decide
how far the NCAA can go in the regulation of student-athletes.
III. ANALYSIS
Initially, Section III.A of this Comment will discuss why studentathletes have standing against the NCAA and why the NCAA is subject
to the Sherman Antitrust Act.121 Section III.B will then engage in a rule
of reason analysis to determine whether the procompetitive effects of the
NCAA Self-Employment Guidelines outweigh the anticompetitive
effects of the Guidelines.122
Student-athletes may choose to rely on the harsh limits that the SelfEmployment Guidelines place on the student-athletes’ ability to market
their own businesses to show that the Self-Employment Guidelines are
114. See id.
115. See NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 3.2.4.6, at 10.
116. See id., art. 12.7.2, at 78.
117. See id., art. 3.2.4.6, at 10.
118. Id., art. 12.7.2.1, at 78.
119. See id.
120. See generally Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); see also O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016); Agnew v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).
121. See infra Sections III.A.1-.2.
122. See infra Section III.B.
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anticompetitive, whereas the NCAA would likely have a persuasive
argument that maintenance of amateurism coupled with equity amongst
member institutions and student-athletes are valid procompetitive
justifications for the Self-Employment Guidelines. Finally, Section III.C
of this Comment will address two athletes who have been, and could be,
sanctioned based on the Self-Employment Guidelines.123 Ultimately, this
Comment will conclude with a recommendation that the Supreme Court
grant certiorari to a case challenging indirect compensation of studentathletes based on athletic ability, and hold that the Self-Employment
Guidelines do not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act.124
A.

Antitrust Analysis of the NCAA Student-Athlete Self-Employment
Guidelines

If student-athletes were to bring suit challenging the SelfEmployment Guidelines on antitrust grounds, courts would be tasked
with deciding issues like standing, whether the Sherman Antitrust Act is
applicable, and the type of antitrust analysis to apply. Notably, the
Supreme Court has consistently found that the NCAA is subject to the
Sherman Antitrust Act, as the NCAA often falls squarely within the
confines of Section One.125 Additionally, lower courts have regularly
recognized student-athletes’ standing to bring suit against the NCAA.126
In a challenge to the Self-Employment Guidelines, courts would likely
find a rule of reason analysis to be appropriate, rather than a per se
analysis.127
1.

Student-Athletes Have Standing

While standing is not a highly litigated issue and standing
requirements differ amongst state and federal courts, courts have widely
accepted that student-athletes do have standing to sue the NCAA for a
variety of claims, including antitrust claims.128 Generally, federal courts
require plaintiffs to show that they have standing by proving three
factors: (a) an “injury in fact,” (b) “a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of,” and (c) a probability that the

123. See infra Section III.C.
124. See infra Part IV.
125. See infra Section III.A.2.
126. See infra Section III.A.1.
127. See infra Section III.A.3.
128. See, e.g., O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1066-69
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016).
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injury will be remedied by a favorable decision.129 Whether the studentathletes argued their standing in court or in their pleadings, numerous
federal cases in which the student-athletes brought suit against the
NCAA under the Sherman Antitrust Act have proceeded with little or no
contention on the issue.130
Similarly, state courts have found that student-athletes have
standing to sue the NCAA.131 For example, in Bloom v. NCAA,132 the
Colorado Court of Appeals found the plaintiff had standing because he
was a third-party beneficiary to the contractual relationship between the
NCAA and the member institution that he attended.133
Overall, student-athletes are generally found to have standing to sue
the NCAA in both federal and state courts.
2.

The NCAA is Subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act

The Supreme Court has made it clear that the NCAA is required to
abide by the limitations set forth in the Sherman Antitrust Act.134 The
most prominent Supreme Court case addressing this subject is Board of
Regents.135 In Board of Regents, as previously mentioned, the University
of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia Athletic Association sued the
NCAA on antitrust grounds arguing that the NCAA’s agreement with a
television network to limit the number of college football games
televised each year, and preventing member institutions from
individually contracting with broadcasters, violated the Sherman
Antitrust Act.136
Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that the NCAA had engaged
in horizontal price fixing, which was a per se violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.137 However, the Court decided to engage in a rule of
reason analysis, reasoning that some horizontal restraints were necessary
in order for college football games to be available on television at all,
and therefore, that the justifications for such regulations should be
129. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
130. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1066-70; see also Agnew, 683 F.3d at 335.
131. See, e.g., Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621, 623-25 (Colo.
App. 2004).
132. Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. App. 2004).
133. See id. at 624 (finding a collegiate skier had standing to sue the NCAA and seek
injunctive relief-although unsuccessfully-for not allowing him to keep endorsement
money).
134. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85, 88 (1984).
135. See id.
136. See Complaint, Bd. Of Regents, supra note 80, at 31-39.
137. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100-01.
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explored.138 Board of Regents notably demonstrates that the NCAA can
be held responsible for unreasonable restraints on trade under the
Sherman Antitrust Act.139
Clearly, the NCAA falls within the purview of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, allowing student-athletes to challenge restrictions and
guidelines that they feel are a violation thereunder.140 Similar to most
NCAA rules and procedures, the Self-Employment Guidelines are
contained within the NCAA Manual,141 which the student-athletes agree
to abide by when signing the Student-Athlete Statement at the outset of
each season.142 The signing of the Student-Athlete Statement constitutes
an agreement between the parties that would fall within the scope of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, and consequently, courts would then be tasked
with deciding whether a per se analysis or rule of reason analysis is
appropriate.
3.

Rule of Reason Analysis is Appropriate

If a court were to analyze the NCAA Self-Employment Guidelines,
a rule of reason analysis would be appropriate. The Court has made it
clear that a per se analysis is a demanding standard that is only
appropriate when the practice at issue is so void of competitive rationales
that further inquiry into the possible justifications for the practice is not
warranted.143 The Self-Employment Guidelines clearly possess a number
of procompetitive rationales that would need to be explored by the
courts.144
Additionally, the Supreme Court and the circuit courts have
recognized the existence of a procompetitive presumption for those
practices of the NCAA that serve to protect the tradition of
amateurism.145 In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court explained that
138. See id. at 100-03.
139. See id. at 120 (finding that the network agreements at issue did constitute an
unreasonable restraint on trade under the Sherman Antitrust Act).
140. See generally id.; O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016); Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).
141. NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 12.4.4, at 72.
142. See NCAA, Form 18-1a, supra note 111, at 1.
143. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100-04; see also Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016-19 (10th Cir. 1998).
144. See infra Section III.B.3.b.
145. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100-03, 120 (finding that the NCAA plays an
important role in preserving the character of college football and making the product
available to the public, which can be viewed as procompetitive); see also Agnew, 683
F.3d at 342-43 (stating that when a restraint is clearly in place to protect the tradition of
amateurism, the court should presume that restraint to be procompetitive).
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“[t]he NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered
tradition of amateurism in college sports [and] [t]here can be no question
but that it needs ample latitude to play that role.”146 The Court went on to
recognize that “a fair evaluation of [the restraint’s] competitive character
require[d] consideration of the NCAA’s justifications for the
restraints.”147
The Self-Employment Guidelines are clearly in place to protect the
tradition of amateurism in college sports by preventing student-athletes
from becoming professionals through compensation for their athletic
ability or status as an NCAA student-athlete.148 Therefore, the NCAA
would be deserving of a procompetitive presumption in this case, and a
rule of reason analysis would be appropriate.
B.

Rule of Reason Analysis

When engaging in a rule of reason analysis to determine the
reasonableness of the NCAA Self-Employment Guidelines, the
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of the NCAA’s SelfEmployment Guidelines must be reviewed.149
1.

Anticompetitive Effects of Self-Employment Guidelines

Student-athletes would likely argue that the NCAA’s SelfEmployment Guidelines have one primary anticompetitive effect: the
Self-Employment Guidelines place a harsh limit on student-athletes’
abilities to market their products or businesses, which, therefore, restricts
the student-athletes’ earning capacities within their permissible
employment. Additionally, student-athletes would likely argue that, by
preventing them from using all of the resources at their disposal to start
and promote their business, the NCAA is unreasonably restricting their
earning capacity.
The Self-Employment Guidelines, outlined in NCAA Manual
Article 12.4.4, prevent student-athletes from using their name, image,
likeness, or reputation as an NCAA student-athlete in the promotion of
their businesses.150 A student-athlete’s name, image, likeness, and
reputation are extremely valuable to a business owner for many reasons,

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
Id. at 103.
See supra Sections II.C.1-.2.
See infra Sections III.B.1-.3.
NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 12.4.4, at 72.
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including advertising and endorsements.151 Non-student-athlete business
owners would easily be able to use these resources in the promotion of
their businesses. Therefore, the Self-Employment Guidelines clearly
limit the student-athlete business owner’s ability to promote his or her
product or business. By not allowing the student-athletes to utilize these
viable resources in their businesses, student-athletes will argue that they
are crippled in such a way that sets them apart from other business
owners, thereby severely restricting the financial success of their
businesses.
2.

Procompetitive Effects of Self-Employment Guidelines

The NCAA, on the other hand, would be able to point to many
procompetitive effects to justify their Self-Employment Guidelines.
Some of the most persuasive of these procompetitive effects include: (a)
the preservation of one of the NCAA’s characteristic features, the
tradition of amateurism; (b) the preservation of equity between member
institutions; and (c) the preservation of equity between studentathletes.152 Each of these effects has a clear positive effect on
competition.
a.

Preservation of Amateurism

As previously mentioned, courts have found the protection of the
tradition of amateurism to be a persuasive procompetitive justification
for NCAA regulations.153 This phenomenon is often referred to as a
procompetitive presumption.154 Despite finding the television agreement
at issue to be an unreasonable restraint on trade, the Supreme Court in
Board of Regents recognized that the NCAA plays a vital role in
“preserv[ing the] tradition [of amateurism] that might otherwise die,” and
that the NCAA needs “ample latitude to play that role.”155 Lower courts
have interpreted this language to mean that when an NCAA regulation is
clearly designed to help maintain the tradition of amateurism, that
regulation will be presumed to be procompetitive.156

151. See Laura Lee Stapleton & Matt McMurphy, The Professional Athlete’s Right of
Publicity, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 23, 23 (1999).
152. See infra Sections III.B.2.a-.c.
153. See supra Section III.A.3.
154. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85, 100-03, 120 (1984); see also Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d
328, 342-43 (7th Cir. 2012).
155. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
156. See Agnew, 683 F.3d at 342-43.
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Moreover, the NCAA is explicit in its goal of maintaining a “clear
line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports,”157 and achieves that goal through its amateurism and eligibility
rules delineated in Article 12 of the NCAA Manual.158 A primary
characteristic of professional athletes, which is forbidden amongst
amateur athletes, is receiving financial benefit from the use of the
athlete’s name, image, likeness, and reputation.159 Therefore, because the
NCAA’s Self-Employment Guidelines, which prohibit the use of
student-athletes’ name, image, likeness, and reputation in the course of
their businesses, are in place to maintain the tradition of amateurism
amongst student-athletes, the NCAA is accordingly deserving of the
procompetitive presumption.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet granted certiorari to a case
that addresses the issue of employment compensation directly, the
Court’s recent denial of certiorari to both parties in O’Bannon is
telling.160 As previously discussed, the Supreme Court’s denial of
certiorari allowed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, which denied the studentathletes’ demands for compensation above the cost of attendance at their
respective schools, to stand.161 This decision effectively safeguarded the
tradition of amateurism.162 While defending the tradition of amateurism,
the court noted that “not paying student-athletes is precisely what makes
them amateurs.”163
Similar to the court’s argument in O’Bannon, the NCAA could
argue that not allowing student-athletes to exploit their name, image, and
likeness for financial gain is also precisely what makes them amateurs.
The use of one’s name, image, and likeness to promote a business or
product, whether your own or that of a third party, is arguably a practice
reserved for professionals.164 A student-athlete who owns his own
157. NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 1.3.1, at 1.
158. See id., art. 12, at 61-91.
159. See id.; see also Stapleton & McMurphy, supra note 151, at 23 (finding that
“[o]ur infatuation with our favorite sports heroes is so strong that many advertisers pay
professional athletes millions of dollars in order to entice more people to buy their
products.”).
160. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 137 S. Ct. 277 (mem.) (2016)
(denying certiorari to petitioner O’Bannon); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. O’Bannon,
137 S. Ct. 277 (mem.) (2016) (denying certiorari to petitioner NCAA).
161. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016).
162. See id. at 1076.
163. Id.
164. See id. (noting that not paying student-athletes is what makes them amateurs).
Arguably, a student-athlete’s use of his or her name, image, likeness, or reputation as an
NCAA student-athlete in marketing for his or her business would be an indirect form of
payment for being a student-athlete.
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business would be treating himself as a professional if he were to use the
value in his photographs or reputation to financially benefit in such a
way that a non-NCAA-athlete would not be able to. The celebrity that
often comes with being an NCAA student-athlete is valuable; however,
using that status to benefit the student-athlete’s personal business
ventures crosses the line between amateur and professional.
b.

Equity Between Member Institutions

Equity
amongst
member
institutions
is
undoubtedly
procompetitive.165 Institutions with similar resources and levels of
prestige have greater competition in recruiting and on the playing field,
which leads to more entertaining games and greater popularity for the
sport, the teams, and intercollegiate athletics in general. The NCAA
could successfully argue that the Self-Employment Guidelines
preventing student-athletes from using their names, images, likenesses,
and reputations to benefit their personal businesses work to maintain
equity between member institutions.
When athletes are deciding where to attend college, they consider a
number of factors. For example, student-athletes consider financial aid,
educational opportunities, and the reputation of the team and the
university. Allowing student-athletes to create businesses that directly
benefit from their status as an NCAA athlete could lead student-athletes
to consider many other factors, like potential market size, when deciding
which institution to attend. Thus, allowing student-athletes to create
businesses that directly benefit from their status would likely lead to a
slippery slope of schools in larger cities and larger markets becoming
more desirable because of seemingly greater opportunities for
commercial success there.
Presently, the NCAA and the courts have recognized strict limits
that prevent student-athletes from receiving financial aid above the cost
of attendance at their school.166 Removing the Self-Employment
Guidelines would likely lead to athletes taking into consideration the
possibility of additional compensation, through the creation of their own
business, on top of the financial aid that they receive from their
institution. The NCAA would likely argue that this in turn would lead to
athletes choosing schools based off of where they could make the most
money, thus creating a situation in which larger schools, or schools in
larger cities, would be significantly more attractive than smaller schools
165. But see Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of
Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 358-361 (2007).
166. See NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 15, at 195-220.
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because of the larger markets and the greater opportunity to make money
at those larger schools. Therefore, the NCAA’s Self-Employment
Guidelines are necessary to maintain the equity, and thus, the
competition, between member institutions.
c.

Equity Amongst Student-Athletes

The NCAA could additionally claim that the Self-Employment
Guidelines are procompetitive because they help to maintain equity
amongst student-athletes. Similar to equity between member institutions,
equity between student-athletes helps to enhance competition by keeping
all of the student-athletes on an equal playing field. Naturally, some
student-athletes gain more name-recognition and popularity than
others,167 and significant differences in popularity likely affords some
student-athletes greater economic opportunity than others. To remove
these Self-Employment Guidelines and allow popular student-athletes to
financially benefit, directly or indirectly, from their athletic ability would
create a harshly unequal playing field.
Further, the NCAA would likely argue that these popular studentathletes would receive an unfair advantage based on the additional
compensation they receive from their business. This advantage could
come in the form of better living conditions, food, or medical care. The
NCAA would also note that without this additional compensation from
their businesses, student-athletes would be equal in each of these areas,
as they would all rely solely upon their schools for these products and
services.168 Therefore, the Self-Employment Guidelines are arguably
procompetitive in that they are necessary to maintain fairness and
equality, and subsequently, viable competition, between student-athletes.

167. For example, far more people throughout the country could name or recognize
Penn State Football’s Saquon Barkley before they could name or recognize any player on
Penn State’s women’s basketball team.
168. Student-athletes would rely on their schools to provide these products and
services either directly or indirectly. Schools could directly provide these products and
services in the form of team sponsored meals or medical care from the university’s
athletic trainers. Schools could provide these products and services indirectly by
providing student-athletes with financial aid up to the cost of attendance, thus financially
sponsoring student-athlete choices in food and housing. See generally Megan Fleming,
Perks of Being a Student Athlete at Penn State, ONWARD STATE, (Oct. 31, 2014, 4:14
AM),
https://onwardstate.com/2014/10/31/perks-of-being-a-student-athlete-at-pennstate/.
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Are the Self-Employment Guidelines Necessary to Achieve a
Legitimate Objective or Can the Objective be Achieved in a
Substantially Less Restrictive Manner?

The NCAA’s named objective is to maintain a “clear line of
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”169
As previously discussed, this line is maintained through the tradition of
amateurism and the guidelines set forth in Article 12 of the NCAA
Manual.170 This goal is clearly legitimate, as the tradition of amateurism
has been a pillar of the NCAA since its inception,171 and courts have
recognized the importance of amateurism to intercollegiate athletics and
have consistently protected it.172
The NCAA would likely argue that the Self-Employment
Guidelines are necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of differentiating
intercollegiate athletics from professional sports, and to financially
benefit from one’s athletic ability, directly or indirectly, is to be a
professional athlete. It would be virtually impossible to create a less
restrictive rule that would also prevent a student-athlete from improperly
financially benefiting from his or her athletic ability. The NCAA would
continue to argue that while it would be difficult in some cases to prove
or quantify the amount that student-athletes’ uses of their names, images,
likenesses, or statuses as NCAA athletes helped them earn, it is likely
that any of these elements, together or separately, could have a positive
effect on the student-athlete’s business. While a student-athlete’s
entrepreneurial spirit is admirable, the Self-Employment Guidelines are
necessary to achieve the NCAA’s goal of differentiating intercollegiate
athletics from professional sports through amateurism.
In response to the NCAA’s arguments, student-athletes may argue
that a less restrictive way of accomplishing the NCAA’s goal would be
to measure each self-employed student-athlete’s popularity and influence
to determine if his or her name, image, likeness, or status as an NCAA
athlete would have a noticeable effect on the success of his or her
business. This could be accomplished by considering the studentathlete’s social media following and the number of times the studentathlete is mentioned and discussed in the media by third parties. Studentathletes may also suggest that, on a case-by-case basis, a series of focus

169. NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 1.3.1, at 1.
170. See id., art. 12, at 61-91; see also supra Section III.B.2.a.
171. See supra Section II.A.
172. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85, 120 (1984); see also Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328,
342-43 (7th Cir. 2012); supra Section III.B.2.a.
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groups could be conducted, in which the product or service is presented
without the student-athlete’s name, image, likeness, and status, and then
the product or service is presented with those elements, to determine if
the business is impacted by those elements. A court, however, would
likely find that this suggestion is not a less restrictive means of
accomplishing the NCAA’s goal because it places an enormous burden
on the NCAA to thoroughly investigate each individual student-athlete,
which is extremely unrealistic.
Additionally, student-athletes may also argue that a less restrictive
way to accomplish the NCAA’s goal of differentiating intercollegiate
athletics from professional sports would be to allow student-athletes to
use their name, image, likeness, and status in the promotion of their
business, but require a percentage of those sales to be paid to the NCAA
and the student-athlete’s institution. This practice of splitting sales would
arguably allow the student-athletes to have and promote their businesses
as they see fit, but not allow them to be unfairly compensated based on
their status as an NCAA student-athlete. However, this argument would
likely be unsuccessful because it ignores the tradition of amateurism and
its importance as the primary division separating intercollegiate athletics
from professional sports.
Ultimately, the NCAA’s argument that the Self-Employment
Guidelines are the least restrictive way of accomplishing its goal is
significantly more persuasive. Thus, a court should find that the SelfEmployment Guidelines are sufficiently competitive and justified, as
they would satisfy the requirements of a rule of reason analysis.
C.

LaMelo Ball and Donald De La Haye

LaMelo Ball, now sixteen years old, was only thirteen when he
committed to play basketball at the University of California in Los
Angeles (“UCLA”).173 He has been a highly anticipated recruit, and his
talent, along with his famous family,174 has already made him into “a
173. Although LaMelo Ball has recently decided to forego his potential NCAA career
to begin a professional career in Europe, his athletic ability, stardom, and successful
business are still relevant to the debate on the NCAA Self-Employment Guidelines. In
December 2017, LaMelo Ball, and his brother, LiAngelo Ball, decided to sign one-year
contracts to play professional basketball for Prienu Vytautas, a small team in Lithuania.
See Scott Davis, LiAngelo and LaMelo Ball were lured to their Lithuanian basketball
team when a team employee DMed their agent on Twitter, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 23,
2017, 6:39 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/liangelo-lamelo-ball-lithuanian-teamtwitter-2017-12.
174. LaMelo Ball is the son of former professional basketball player LaVar Ball, and
is the younger brother of Los Angeles Lakers player Lonzo Ball. See Michael McCann,
Who Needs the Other More: High School Phenom LaMelo Ball or the NCAA?, SPORTS
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public figure and a highly marketable athlete.”175 Ball recognized the
value of his popularity, and chose to capitalize with the creation of the
Big Baller Brand with his family.176 Recently, the Big Baller Brand came
out with a new sneaker inspired by LaMelo, called the “Melo Ball 1.”177
LaMelo can regularly be seen advertising and promoting these sneakers
on social media, including multiple Instagram posts on both his personal
profile and the Big Baller Brand’s profile.178 In these photographs and
videos, LaMelo is seen both wearing the sneakers and talking about them
while playing basketball.179 The NCAA has been upfront in expressing
that these practices could make him ineligible to participate in
intercollegiate athletics because he would be in direct violation of NCAA
Manual Article 12.180
LaMelo Ball is precisely the type of athlete that the NCAA SelfEmployment Guidelines were designed to curtail. To allow him to use
his celebrity, which is derived directly from his athletic ability, to make
large amounts of money selling $395 “signature” sneakers and still
continue to receive the benefits of being considered an amateur, would
be clearly inequitable. To allow this kind of indirect compensation for
athletic ability would be to place those student-athletes on a different
playing field than those without that opportunity. It would be naïve to
ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.si.com/nba/2017/09/07/lamelo-ball-big-ballerbrand-ucla-ncaa-nba-lavar-ball-lonzo-ball.
175. Id.
176. See id. Big Baller Brand is a privately held company founded by Chief Executive
Officer LaVar Ball. Id. Due to the private nature of the company, it is unclear exactly
who has an ownership interest in the company. For purposes of this Comment, it will be
assumed that LaMelo Ball is a part owner in Big Baller Brand.
177. See Tyler Lauletta, LaMelo Ball now has his own $400 Big Baller Brand shoes
raising concerns about college eligibility, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 31, 2017, 5:20 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/lamelo-ball-signature-shoe-big-baller-brand-2017-8.
178. See Big Baller Brand (@bigballerbrand), INSTAGRAM (Aug. 31, 2017, 4:54 PM),
https://www.instagram.com/p/BYdzKAwhVLP/?hl=en&taken-by=bigballerbrand;
see
also Big Baller Brand (@bigballerbrand), INSTAGRAM (Aug. 31, 2017, 5:07 PM),
https://www.instagram.com/p/BYd0pjhB2y9/?hl=en&taken-by=bigballerbrand; see also
LaMelo
Ball
(@melo),
INSTAGRAM
(Aug.
31,
2017),
https://www.instagram.com/p/BYdzkAaHipq/?hl=en&taken-by=melo; LaMelo Ball
(@melo),
INSTAGRAM
(Dec.
7,
2017),
https://www.instagram.com/p/BcbPhjHF9Mq/?hl=en&taken-by=melo.
179. See Big Baller Brand (@bigballerbrand), INSTAGRAM (Aug. 31, 2017, 5:07 PM),
https://www.instagram.com/p/BYd0pjhB2y9/?hl=en&taken-by=bigballerbrand (showing
LaMelo Ball playing basketball while advertising the Melo Ball 1’s).
180. See McCann, supra note 174 (discussing Article 12 of the NCAA Manual, and
the options that LaMelo Ball has to defend himself if the NCAA tries to deem him
ineligible); see also NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 12.4.4, at 72 (stating
that student-athletes may open their own business, but they may not use “the studentathlete’s name, photograph, appearance or athletics reputation” in the promotion of the
business).
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think that upon his arrival at UCLA, LaMelo would not be at a
significant competitive advantage compared to his fellow studentathletes.181
Removing the Self-Employment Guidelines would allow LaMelo to
financially benefit off of his athletic ability, while simultaneously
reaping the benefits and exposure related to his amateur status. The
NCAA relies on amateurism to maintain the equitable entertaining
competition of their product. To destroy that principle in order to allow
some student-athletes, like LaMelo, to line their pockets with money
based off of self-promotion of their own businesses just a couple of years
earlier would be unfair to other student-athletes, the member institutions,
and the NCAA.182
Donald De La Haye, on the other hand, was a kicker for the
University of Central Florida (“UCF”) football team, and was recently
deemed ineligible by the NCAA under the Self-Employment
Guidelines.183 While a student-athlete at UCF, De La Haye developed a
popular YouTube channel called “Deestroying,” which contained videos
depicting his life as a college football player.184 In the videos, De La
Haye is often seen playing football, practicing for football, and hanging
out with teammates in the locker room and other team areas.185 In August
2017, the NCAA deemed De La Haye ineligible because he was
receiving advertising revenue from his YouTube channel, and he refused
to take down the videos when offered a deal to remain NCAA eligible.186

181. While it may be true that certain athletes in widely popular sports like football or
men’s basketball may be viewed differently amongst the general student population, this
does not put them on an unequal playing field to other student-athletes, as they are each
treated equally under the NCAA Manual.
182. The rule clearly allows for student-athletes to have businesses and make money
with them, and only limits the way the products and services can be promoted. See
NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 12.4.4, at 72.
183. See Henry Fernandez, NCAA rules UCF kicker Donald De La Haye ineligible
over
YouTube
profits,
FOX
BUSINESS
(Aug.
7,
2017),
http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2017/08/02/ncaa-rules-ucf-kicker-donald-de-lahaye-ineligible-over-youtube-profits.html.
184. See Donald De La Haye (@Deestroying), YOUTUBE (joined June 5, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC4mLlRa_dezwvytudo9s1sw/featured.
185. See Donald De La Haye (@Deestroying), YOUTUBE (Apr. 1, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HA9ln1wmxgc (showing De La Haye practicing his
sprints for football); see also Donald De La Haye (@Deestroying), YOUTUBE (Mar. 13,
2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d8PG8BJdzfY (showing De La Haye working
out with teammates and practicing his kicking).
186. See Romero, supra note 1. The NCAA offered to allow De La Haye to remain
eligible if he stopped taking revenue for his YouTube videos or if he stopped featuring
aspects of his life as a UCF football player in his YouTube videos. See id.
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While De La Haye’s business was on a much smaller scale than
LaMelo Ball’s, the NCAA’s motivation of protecting amateurism and the
procompetitive justifications for the Self-Employment Guidelines
remains the same. It would be inequitable to other student-athletes and
member institutions, and detrimental to the NCAA’s product, to do away
with the tradition of amateurism by allowing student-athletes to
indirectly profit off of their athletic ability. The Self-Employment
Guidelines only govern student-athletes for a few years, and if a studentathlete feels that his or her business requires the use of his or her name,
image, likeness, or reputation to be successful, then the student-athlete
always has the option to no longer compete in intercollegiate athletics.
By not accepting the NCAA’s offer of terms to keep his eligibility, De
La Haye chose his business over his intercollegiate athletics career, and
that was entirely his decision. However, it would be unfair to the NCAA,
its member institutions, and his fellow student-athletes for De La Haye to
indirectly promote the destruction of the longstanding tradition of
amateurism simply for De La Haye to profit.
IV. CONCLUSION
The NCAA’s Self-Employment Guidelines clearly do not violate
the Sherman Antitrust Act. The procompetitive justifications for the
Guidelines undoubtedly outweigh the anticompetitive effects, and the
Guidelines are the least restrictive way of accomplishing the NCAA’s
legitimate goal of a “clear line of demarcation” between college and
professional sports.187
While the Guidelines may have some anticompetitive effects that
limit student-athletes’ abilities to promote their businesses, thus
restricting their business’ earning capacity, these anticompetitive effects
are plainly outweighed by the plethora of procompetitive justifications.188
The tradition of amateurism is a touchstone of the NCAA that cannot be
discounted.189 The Supreme Court has made it clear that any NCAA
regulation that is in place to protect amateurism is presumed to be
procompetitive.190 While this procompetitive presumption alone may not
overcome the anticompetitive effects, the other procompetitive
justifications of maintaining equity amongst student-athletes and member
institutions help to tip the scale in the NCAA’s favor.
187. See NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 1.3.1, at 1.
188. See supra Section III.B.2.
189. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
190. See id. at 120; see also Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328,
342-43 (7th Cir. 2012).
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While the student-athletes may find these Self-Employment
Guidelines inequitable, they are forgetting that being an amateur is
precisely what makes them an NCAA athlete, and a collection of amateur
athletes is precisely what the NCAA’s product is.191 If the SelfEmployment Guidelines, and principles of amateurism generally, were
eliminated from the NCAA Manual, student-athletes would be able to
receive compensation, directly and indirectly, for their athletic ability,
thus making them professionals.192 The elimination of NCAA regulations
set in place to safeguard amateurism would essentially create a new
minor league for each of the respective sports. To create a new minor
league and to receive direct or indirect compensation would be to forget
the value of the education that student-athletes receive and to completely
disregard a core characteristic of the NCAA’s product.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court should finally grant certiorari to a
case in which a student-athlete challenges an NCAA regulation that
prevents the indirect receipt of compensation for his or her athletic
ability, such as the Self-Employment Guidelines. Perhaps Donald De La
Haye will challenge his ineligibly on antitrust grounds, giving the courts
a chance to weigh-in on this complex issue. When such a challenge does
come before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court should find that the
Self-Employment Guidelines, and other similar guidelines, do not violate
the Sherman Antitrust Act, as the procompetitive justifications clearly
outweigh any potential anticompetitive effects. The maintenance of the
tradition of amateurism, and the preservation of equity amongst
institutions and student-athletes, are important concepts for courts to
consider in order to best protect and preserve the competition of
intercollegiate athletics, both on and off the field.

191. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1076 (9th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016).
192. See Amateur, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com
/definition/amateur (last visited Aug. 19, 2018) (defining an amateur as one “who
engages in a pursuit, especially a sport, on an unpaid basis”).

